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Foresight and International 
Development*
Kate Bingley
Abstract This article provides an overview of the use of foresight‑type 
approaches and techniques in policy‑related work in international 
development. It draws primarily on published and grey literatures, as well 
as select interviews with foresight practitioners. It begins with a brief 
introduction to the approaches and tools used in the field of strategic 
foresight, and then a broad mapping of the foresight landscape as relevant 
to international development. It provides reflections on the evidence of use 
and impact of foresight initiatives, and makes suggestions around future 
directions for foresight in international development.
Keywords: Development, evaluation, foresight, futures, international, 
scenarios.
1 Introduction
In general terms, foresight is about understanding the future systematically, 
usually considering a horizon of  at least ten years into the future (Kuosa 
2011: 9). Slaughter (1995: 48, in Kuosa 2011) defines foresight as a process 
that attempts to broaden the boundaries of  perception in four ways: by 
assessing the implications of  present actions and decisions; by detecting and 
avoiding problems before they occur; by considering the present implications 
of  possible future events; and by envisioning aspects of  desired futures.
Numerous foresight techniques are available for different, specific 
purposes (EEA 2011b: 16). One principal distinction is made between 
quantitative studies that rely heavily on modelling methods, and are 
commonly used in fields of  study such as macroeconomics, energy 
and climate change; and qualitative approaches, which provide a 
narrative description of  futures issues, paths and uncertainties, and that 
have been applied in many sectors ranging from technology foresight 
to environment and politics (EEA 2011a: 9). Each approach has its 
advantages and limitations, and in practice, quantitative modelling and 
qualitative methods are increasingly used in combination.
Another principal distinction is made between horizon-scanning (or 
environment-scanning) approaches, which may involve scanning various 
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sources (including non-traditional literature such as newspapers and 
blogs) for information on emerging trends; model-based projections 
that can provide an understanding of  causal relationships; and broader 
scenario-planning approaches. In their course on foresight, Loveridge, 
Keenan and Saritas (2010) foreground methods such as Delphi (a large-
scale survey tool) and technology roadmapping, in addition to scenarios 
and horizon-scanning approaches.
Valuable sources of  information on specific foresight techniques and 
tools include the UK Horizon Scanning Programme Team’s Futures 
Toolkit (Cabinet Office and Government Office for Science 2014), 
and the Futures Research Methodology compendium produced by 
the Millennium Project,1 the latest edition comprising 39 chapters with 
detailed information on a wide range of  foresight methods (Glenn and 
Gordon n.d.). Both sources detail techniques and tools most commonly 
associated with the general field of  foresight. Loveridge and Cox (2013) 
produced a guide entitled Innovation for Development: Knowledge and 
Research Application to Address International Development Goals: A Toolkit, 
intended for use by planners, policymakers, decision-makers and other 
relevant bodies in government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and the private sector. The notion of  ‘toolkit’ is slightly misleading, 
as the publication does not focus on methods or tools; however, it 
recognises technology and innovation as a major force on human 
development and vice versa, and does provide readers with a good 
introduction to technology foresight more broadly.
Foresight methods are evolving, and being adapted to different contexts. 
The Millennium Project has developed various tools, including the 
Real-Time Delphi and the State of  the Future Index (SOFI). The 
SOFI is a quantitative time series that indicates the changing state of  
the future and shows whether conditions promise to get better or worse. 
The Millennium Project regularly publishes global and regional studies 
such as the 2013–14 State of  the Future, a global report based on the 
SOFI (Glenn, Gordon and Florescu 2014). National-level State of  the 
Future reports have also been produced, but the SOFI is currently only 
applied in a selection of  developed countries.
One aspect of  foresight which has particular relevance to international 
development is the nature of  stakeholder participation in the foresight 
process. In their catalogue of  environmental scenarios, the European 
Environment Agency (EEA 2011a) makes a useful distinction between 
initiatives that are analytic (defined as desk-based research and analysis 
by an individual or a group) and those that are participative. In the 
broader literature, the rationale for participatory processes varies widely, 
and is often implicit rather than explicit. Many government foresight 
units recognise the importance of  involving key policy stakeholders in 
the foresight initiative from the start, in order to inform the process and 
findings, and to secure buy-in and enhance the likelihood of  the findings 
ultimately informing decision-making; this mirrors practice in research 
uptake more broadly. Havas, Schartinger and Weber (2010) describe 
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some of  the process benefits associated with developing context-specific 
scenarios. However, in describing processes as ‘participative’, 
documentation of  foresight initiatives often fails to distinguish between 
expert participation and ordinary citizen participation; which likely 
reflects implicit assumptions regarding how policy change is achieved, 
and also regarding whose voices count in the policymaking process. 
A separate strand of  the foresight literature does, however, focus on 
the opportunities for anticipatory democracy (see, for example, Bezold 
2010), and how ways that futures thinking can ‘reflect the needs of  the 
vast majority of  people, rather than the interests of  the few’ (Ramos, 
Mansfield and Priday 2012: 86).
Having outlined some of  the main approaches to strategic foresight, 
the remainder of  this article deals with foresight in the context of  
international development. Section 2 presents a broad mapping of  
the foresight landscape, as relevant to international development. In 
Section 3, the author shares examples of  scenario processes used in a 
variety of  international development contexts. The author then reflects 
on the evidence of  use and impact of  foresight initiatives in Section 4, 
before concluding and suggesting future directions for foresight in 
international development in Section 5.
2 Mapping the foresight landscape
2.1 Global overview
Foresight initiatives have been undertaken around the world by a wide 
range of  international development actors including international 
intergovernmental organisations (multilateral agencies), governments 
in the global North (or bilateral agencies), philanthropic foundations, 
as well as academia (universities, research institutes, policy thinktanks) 
and NGOs/civil society organisations (CSOs) in the North and South. 
Examples can be found at the national, regional or global level in sectors 
such as health, agriculture and food, governance, conflict and security, 
climate change and the environment, technology and innovation. 
However, documentation of  foresight initiatives undertaken in least 
developed countries is relatively sparse. The level of  resources invested 
in foresight initiatives varies enormously, from a modest local exercise 
conducted involving a few staff members at minimal cost, to a large-
scale international project costing US$24 million (the total cost of  the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2005) at the upper end of  the scale.
There are varying degrees of  foresight activity in different regions. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) has played a pivotal role in the 
development of  a foresight culture (Popper and Medina 2008: 259). 
UNIDO’s Technology Foresight Programme for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (TFLAC) was launched in 1999; this led Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela to initiate preparatory 
activities for setting up national programmes, but only some of  these 
countries managed to institutionalise a technology foresight programme 
(ibid.). According to the most recent mapping exercise undertaken by the 
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European Foresight Monitoring Network (EFMN), foresight initiatives 
in Latin America tend to be national in scope and feed into national 
policymaking processes, but they are more often sponsored by non-state 
actors such as international organisations or NGOs than by their own 
government (EFMN 2009: 36).
Africa is excluded from the data altogether; the authors acknowledge 
that Africa remains under-represented in the report, and attribute this 
in part to the fact that foresight is commonly understood as technology 
foresight, and ‘Africa’s roles in technological innovation remain 
rather limited (and perhaps in some respects invisible)’, and that work 
undertaken by forecasters, modellers or scenario-builders in other topics 
unrelated to technology are not properly represented (ibid.: Foreword). 
In the same vein, the Global Foresight Outlook 2007 data indicates that 
only 11 of  846 initiatives mapped globally are African. In comparing 
foresight ‘style’ in six world regions, Keenan and Popper (2008: 34) note 
that ‘the data for Oceania and Africa have been deemed inadequate for 
inclusion in our analyses’.
2.2 International institutional programmes
The OECD2 Secretariat and the EU European Commission created 
dedicated futures research units in the late 1980s, and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) followed 
suit in the early 1990s (Sagasti 2004). The OECD’s International 
Futures Programme promotes forums, projects and networks (OECD 
2010). The primary policy focus of  recent studies has been on OECD 
member countries, although one study of  the ‘bioeconomy to 2030’ 
explicitly states the relevance of  its findings to developing countries 
(OECD 2009). The Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC), a member of  
the OECD Development Cluster, is a group of  West African regional 
organisations, countries and international organisations that exchange 
experiences and perspectives to help build more effective regional 
policies. The SWAC Secretariat plays a role in foresight by providing 
independent and forward-looking analysis which aims to enrich the 
debate and better inform decision-makers about future challenges.
In 1992, UNDP set up the African Futures project to support African 
countries to undertake forward-looking studies and develop a long-term 
vision of  their development. Between 1992 and 1995, African Futures 
provided technical support to the planning and implementation of  
25 national studies that reflected on visions and alternative strategies 
for the future; one example of  such a process is Burundi Vision 2025. 
Publications of  the African Futures project include a set of  four scenarios 
for Africa in the year 2025 (Sall and Mbeki 2003). In early 2004, UNDP 
established the African Futures Institute (AFI) in order to harness the gains 
made under the African Futures project, and to sustain futures analysis 
in the region. Registered in South Africa, the AFI positions itself  as a 
pan-African organisation, with a vision to facilitate Africa’s formulation of  
its own path to development, developing its own methods and approaches.
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UNESCO’s Foresight Programme is located in its Bureau of  Strategic 
Planning, and it convenes a futures forum, as well as organising lectures 
and seminars. The stated purpose of  the programme is to sensitise 
members of  the global UNESCO Secretariat as well as member 
states to future trends in education, the natural sciences, the social 
and human sciences, culture and information and communication, 
and to support member states in developing their own capacities and 
approaches in the field of  foresight. In May 2014, a three-day forum 
was organised by UNESCO’s Imagining Africa’s Futures project, in 
collaboration with the University of  the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 
and the Southern African Node of  the Millennium Project. This 
symposium, ‘All Africa Futures Forum: Transforming Africa’s Future’, 
brought together African futures thinkers and practitioners with the 
aim of  exploring ‘how the “discipline of  anticipation” has been shaped 
and applied in Africa and how it can be deliberately leveraged towards 
transforming Africa’s future onto more positive trajectories.’3 One of  
the stated objectives was to enable the establishment of  an African 
Network of  Foresight Practitioners.
Hilbert, Miles and Othmer (2009) describe an initiative supported by 
the UN that they believe to be the ‘most extensive online participatory 
policy-making foresight exercise in the history of  intergovernmental 
processes in the developing world to date’. The process comprised a 
five-round Delphi exercise and secured 1,454 contributions, which 
were then fed into intergovernmental decision-making as part of  the 
Regional Action Plan for the Information Society in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (eLAC2010). The authors highlight the governments’ 
acknowledgement of  the value of  collective intelligence from civil society, 
academic and private sector participants of  the Delphi and the ensuing 
appreciation of  participative policymaking. On the basis of  the 
eLAC experience, Hilbert et al. (ibid.) advocate the potential of  online 
foresight tools to facilitate participation in resource-scarce developing 
countries. UN agencies have sponsored many high-profile foresight 
exercises to explore concerns and problems that transcend national 
boundaries. These include the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(2005), Global Environment Outlook (UNEP 2012), the Global Energy 
Assessment 2012 (GEA 2012), and the Fifth Assessment Report of  the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
2.3 The UK Foresight Programme
The UK Foresight Programme was established in 1994 to embed 
a futures approach in strategic policymaking in government. It is 
considered a relatively mature programme in the European context, 
together with Sweden and the Netherlands (EEA 2011b). Studies 
are essentially expert-led, reflecting the ‘less egalitarian/participative 
tradition to policy making’ observed in the institutional arrangements 
of  the UK compared to Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands (EEA 
2011b: 49). There is, however, broader engagement with stakeholders, 
and especially decision-makers, from an early stage in the process 
in order to secure their buy-in and to facilitate effective uptake of  
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the findings. Table 1 outlines the main projects of  the UK Foresight 
Programme that intersect with international development.
Against the backdrop of  these large-scale studies, the UK’s Foresight 
Horizon Scanning Centre (HSC) was created in 2005 to tackle narrow 
policy questions often at the request of  a particular department. 
Horizon scanning occurs in a wide range of  UK government 
departments, including DFID. Horizon scanning, deemed ‘the 
foundation of  foresight’ by Loveridge et al. (2010), has a distinctive role 
to play in the realm of  international development, notably to support 
identification of  key issues and challenges of  the future, as in the case 
of  a scanning exercise commissioned by the UK Collaborative on 
Development Sciences (UKCDS) on behalf  of  DFID in 2010, based 
on interviews with leading international development thinkers (see 
Rhydderch 2010).
2.4 The Rockefeller Foundation
The Rockefeller Foundation has established the Searchlight function, a 
programme of  horizon scanning with a view to informing philanthropic 
decision-making. The foundation works with 12 partners which 
conduct regular regionally-focused scans across Asia, Africa and the 
Americas. According to Juech and Michelson (2012), the development 
and philanthropic sectors have generally been slow to adopt foresight 
Table 1 Projects of the UK Foresight Programme with relevance to international development
Project Collaboration Papers commissioned
Reducing Risks of Future Disasters 
(2010–12)
Expert group involved representatives 
from NGOs, academia and the private 
sector
14 papers
Global Food and Farming Futures 
(2009–11)
Politically co-sponsored by DFID and 
DEFRA
Follow-up actions4 identified for UN, 
OECD, Oxfam, Gates Foundation and 
World Economic Forum
>100 evidence papers
Migration and Global Environmental 
Change (2009–11)
Partners included UNHCR, UNICEF 
and DFID
Involved 350 experts and stakeholders, 
across 30 countries. Workshops in 
Ghana and India
70 papers and other reviews
Detection and Identification of 
Infectious Diseases in UK and Africa 
(2004–6)
Collaboration with African Union
Process involved >300 leading 
experts and stakeholders from 
nearly 30 countries (including 20 
African countries), as well as many 
international organisations
>60 science reviews, papers and case 
studies
Source Author’s own.
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practices, lagging behind businesses and government, and the 
Searchlight function represents the first systematic trend monitoring 
effort in the philanthropic and broader social sector. The Searchlight 
function ‘demonstrates how the practice of  anticipating and tracking 
trends and envisioning different alternatives for how global issues might 
evolve can be harnessed to shape the future of  human development and 
to improve the lives of  poor and vulnerable populations’ (ibid.: 439). 
One of  the organisations collaborating with the Rockefeller Foundation 
is the Institute for Alternative Futures (IAF). In 2009, the IAF convened 
a workshop of  leading foresight experts in Bellagio. The workshop 
report (Bezold et al. 2009) highlights the rationale and practice of  
pro-poor foresight – a term coined to mean foresight as applied for the 
purposes of  human development – in accelerating and enhancing 
‘smart globalisation’ and in gaining a better understanding of  foresight 
in relation to a set of  key issues that are relevant to the global South.
The Institute for the Future (IFTF) played a major role in Rockefeller’s 
Catalysts for Change project, which was based on the premise that 
collaboration on a global scale can yield unique insights into ways 
to create a more prosperous, equitable future. The project sought to 
augment the diverse horizon-scanning exercises concerning poverty 
and social change by integrating bottom-up, crowd-sourced ideas for 
innovation, using a proper visualisation tool as a common language 
and framework (Vian et al. 2012: 451). To this end, a three-day global 
collaborative foresight game was convened which engaged with 
1,600-plus people in more than 79 countries. In describing this exercise 
Vian et al. (2012: 466) observed, ‘Foresight and forecasting practices 
have their modern roots in elite institutions that often look at the 
future “from the outside in”. But in a world of  high connectivity and 
increasing transparency of  information, the capacity for participatory 
foresight practices “from within” has already changed the landscape of  
analysis and guidance of  our complex global systems.’
3 Scenarios
Scenarios offer examples of  possible futures, which are then used to 
explore how the world would change if  certain trends were to strengthen 
or diminish, or various events were to occur. These scenarios can be 
used to review or test a range of  plans and policy options; to stimulate 
the development of  new policies, or as the basis for a strategic vision; 
and as a means of  identifying ‘early warning’ indicators that signal a 
shift towards a certain kind of  future. The Foresight HSC (2009) states 
that scenario planning is for medium- to long-term strategic analysis and 
planning; it describes scenarios as narratives set in the future.
Wright, Cairns and Bradfield (2013: 561) suggest that scenario 
techniques and methods range from quantitative modelling approaches 
to qualitative narrative methods, and mixed methods that encapsulate 
both. For example, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) uses the 
International Futures (IFs) forecasting system to generate quantitative 
scenarios such as those presented in African Futures 2050 (Cilliers, 
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Hughes and Moyer 2011). A range of  quantitative, qualitative and 
mixed method scenarios can be found among those generated by 
global foresight exercises and international assessments and those 
documented in the EEA’s catalogue of  scenarios in the environmental 
field (EEA 2011a).
Gordon (2011) classifies scenarios as either adaptive or normative. 
Adaptive (or future-aligning) scenarios are developed by organisations 
and institutions in order to ensure they are fit for purpose; this includes 
the use of  scenarios as part of  organisational strategic planning 
exercises, as well as country or regional-level long-term development 
planning and visioning. By contrast, normative (future-influencing) 
scenarios, also known as visionary scenarios, are used to influence and 
shape the future. There are a significant number of  scenario sets in the 
public domain that relate to policy questions relevant to international 
development; however, their usefulness can be limited because of  
insufficient background information. The examples discussed below 
make use of  narratives, developed as part of  foresight initiatives 
conducted on a more modest scale, as compared to the large foresight 
studies associated with intergovernmental organisations.
3.1 Adaptive scenarios
There are examples of  adaptive scenario use in bilateral agencies such 
as DFID as well as international non-governmental organisations 
(INGOs). According to Foresight HSC’s Scenario Planning Guidance 
Note (2009: 5), ‘DFID, the FCO [Foreign & Commonwealth Office] and 
the cross-departmental Stabilisation Unit have undertaken country and 
region-focused scenario planning to inform strategy and programmes, 
and to improve coordination.’ Neil MacDonald facilitated scenario 
processes for DFID in Sudan, Iraq and Kosovo between 2002 and 
2007 (interview, 7 April 2014). The Sudan scenario-building exercise 
was a collaboration between DFID, the FCO and the Ministry of  
Defence (MoD). It was well resourced, and it comprised a research 
phase, involving three or four researchers, as well as three days in 
Khartoum. The Iraq scenarios of  2007 were ‘more typical’ in resourcing 
terms; there was a research phase, and a workshop convened with UK 
government/DFID staff based in London. The Kosovo scenarios were 
done hurriedly and on a much smaller scale, with very little research 
input (ibid.). Scenarios have also been used by DFID Yemen and DFID 
Nepal to develop contingency plans (Foresight HSC 2009: 14–18).
DFID’s 2008 draft guidance on country and regional planning states that 
scenario planning should be included as part of  the Country Assistance 
Planning (CAP) process (DFID 2008). There is no evidence available 
on the extent to which these guidelines have been followed in practice. 
However, Foresight HSC (2009) provides two case study examples 
demonstrating ways in which scenario planning has been used for planning 
by DFID. The first example is DFID Bangladesh, which developed 
scenarios to 2020 to inform their new CAP. The two-month process was 
facilitated by external consultants; data were collected and analysed from 
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internal and external sources, interviews were conducted with external 
experts on Bangladesh (but no internal experts), and a two-day workshop 
was held. The second example is DFID Nicaragua, which led a scenario-
planning exercise as part of  their exit strategy, as a way to help the wider 
international donor community examine their policy engagement in 
the country. The three-month exercise involved international donors, 
representatives of  NGOs and civil society, the private sector and academia. 
Nicaraguan experts were involved in the analysis.
There are other examples of  scenario sets that have been commissioned 
by DFID, presumably to inform thematic priority-setting, such as 
Ballantyne, Curry and Sumner (2011) on the impacts of  the financial 
crisis, and Pickens, Porteous and Rotman (2009) on scenarios for 
branchless banking. However, limited information is available on how 
these were conducted. The Outsights (2004) project presents scenarios 
for the very poorest from 2030: research papers were commissioned; 
30 interviews were conducted with stakeholders from government, 
multilateral agencies, business, NGOs, the media and academia; and 
workshops were held.
MacDonald (2004) outlines CARE International’s experience using 
scenarios in Sudan to clarify roles and objectives. With CARE 
International UK, a three-day workshop was facilitated, which included 
people from other NGOs, government and the media; journalists were 
included for their ‘ability to grasp the bigger picture’. Scenarios were 
developed to 2023, against which they then assessed their strategic 
options. MacDonald notes also that planning has to shift from linear 
thinking to a creative and flexible response that is able to anticipate 
change early and respond. He concludes that whereas scenario analysis 
has been widely used by the private sector since the 1970s, the ‘use of  
scenarios in development NGOs is still in its infancy and there is much 
still to learn’ (2004: 119). Ramalingam (2012) argues that development 
and humanitarian agencies need to be agile in their response, and that 
this fits closely with the resilience agenda.
Literature on the application of  foresight in the humanitarian sector 
is surprisingly scarce. Humanitarian Horizons: A Practitioners’ Guide to the 
Future (Humanitarian Futures Programme 2009) presents trends and 
projections based on reports by leading thinkers in the areas of  climate 
change, globalisation, demographics and changes in the humanitarian 
system. The authors advocate the need for humanitarian agencies to 
be forward-thinking and to manage risk more proactively, rather than 
being risk averse.
Many African countries have national planning commissions, and 
have used scenario building as part of  processes to develop long-term 
strategies; examples include South Africa’s Vision 2025, Kenya Vision 
2030 and Namibia’s Vision 2030. These initiatives reflect the broad 
consensus in Africa in the early 1990s that African nations needed to 
set their own agendas and anchor them in long-term visions driven 
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by African interests and demands (Martin-Breen 2014). According to 
Professor Alioune Sall, Director of  the AFI, they have been keen to 
ensure that foresight exercises are conducted as much as possible in 
a participatory manner, in order to facilitate citizen participation in 
reflecting on and answering core questions such as: ‘Where do we want 
to get to as nations?’ (Ibrahim 2013). He goes on to say that ‘Where 
our calls [for support] have been heeded, countries have been able to 
avoid the pitfalls of  foresight exercises turning out to be another closed 
exercise led by technocrats talking to other technocrats; they have seized 
these as an opportunity to open and sustain a conversation on the 
past, the present and the future of  the nation.’ Arguably, this kind of  
scenario exercise starts to converge with the normative or visionary type 
described below.
3.2 Normative scenarios
Andreescu et al. (2013) suggest that normative foresight exercises result 
in scenarios in which there is a greater concern with the basic values, 
and procedural arrangements governing the future world depicted 
in the scenario. This is highly relevant in the example of  scenario 
processes in East Africa facilitated by the Society for International 
Development (SID). SID was instrumental in initiating processes for the 
development of  national scenarios in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, 
and also at the regional level, but the processes were designed to 
maximise ownership at local and national level. Heinzen (2004a) labels 
these scenarios as public interest scenarios, concerned with developing 
skills and opportunities for public dialogue, facing uncertainty through 
collaborative learning processes, and developing capacity for political 
agreement. According to Harcourt and Muliro (2004: 2), ‘SID’s 
own interest in exploring scenario exercises in Eastern Africa in the 
mid-1990s was driven largely by the fact that far-reaching structural 
adjustments were being undertaken in various countries with seemingly 
scant concern for long-term impacts and the choices that some of  
these adjustments would inevitably foster. The absence of  broad-based 
dialogue on these key issues was one indicator (…)’. The South African 
scenarios (such as the renowned Mont Fleur scenarios – see Kahane 
(1992) and Gillespie (2004)) also provided inspiration (Muliro, interview 
7 April 2014). Whilst the special issue of  the journal Development 
(Heinzen 2004b) does not provide a detailed overview of  the specific 
tools used as part of  the scenario-building exercises, the articles do 
provide information on aspects of  the process, and especially the public 
engagement dimension. The East Africa scenarios were not the first in 
the region, but their innovation was the active involvement of  a wide 
cross-section of  interests and stakeholders, through an ambitious public 
dissemination component.
The Kenya scenarios were a conscious attempt at participative 
policymaking, in an effort to provide an alternative to undemocratic 
governance. The exercise conducted from 1998–2000 comprised a 
research component, with a small grant from the British Council; 
five workshops convened every four to eight weeks; and an extensive 
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dissemination process. SID partnered with the Kenyan policy thinktank 
Institute of  Economic Affairs (IEA) to support organisation of  the 
events held in Kenya. The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) was the main donor of  the process, with a 
grant of  US$200,000 to SID. The one-year dissemination process, 
which focused on use of  the scenarios to catalyse dialogue, comprised 
two phases (Maina and Sivi 2004): the first targeted opinion leaders 
in the public sector, private sector and civil society; the second phase 
targeted the general public. The second phase was carried out through 
partnering with credible and respected community organisations; core 
roadshow activities included a series of  participatory theatre workshops 
and presentations, as well as distribution of  a research compendium 
(with the broad facts, data and arguments behind the scenarios, and 
what was driving the trends) and a 48-page booklet which laid out the 
four scenarios in story form. The scenarios were met with enthusiasm: 
‘People wanted to listen, wanted to share their stories. Only in one place 
they were chased away by agents of  the state. In other places they were 
sent to break up the meeting but ended up staying’ (Muliro, interview 
7 April 2014).
4 Impact
Until recently there have been remarkably few evaluations of  futures and 
foresight work (Slaughter 2009: 16; EEA 2011a; Havas et al. 2010: 97), 
and there is scant literature on appropriate evaluation frameworks. 
There is a general reliance on self-evaluation; and government foresight 
activities have generally been evaluated by the agencies responsible for 
commissioning the studies, or foresight practitioners (Milojević 2013).
The foresight literature provides plenty of  examples of  the challenges of  
embedding foresight studies in policy decision-making. Sagasti (2004: 1) 
notes the oft-observed challenge of  linking ‘future-oriented exercises to 
the messiness and immediacy of  political events and decision-making’, 
and in this respect foresight shares many common challenges with 
research more generally. It is difficult for policymakers to make the 
time; policymakers may not own the process; foresight studies generally 
consider the long-term future horizon, and this may be incompatible 
with short-term political thinking; and the implications of  a foresight 
study may be unclear (Rhydderch 2013). Schultz (2006: 11) notes 
that horizon scanning’s design criteria do not augur well for its quick 
uptake and widespread dissemination in any evidence-based decision 
environment; for whilst research is expected to be authoritative, a 
horizon scan is necessarily associated with uncertainty.
Johnston (2010) notes that members of  the International Foresight 
Professionals’ Network are under pressure to demonstrate the value 
of  investments in foresight in consequent policy and planning. His 
foresight impact schema includes awareness-raising, informing, 
enabling, influencing and directing policy. Kuosa (2011: 22) considers 
tangible as well as intangible outcomes of  foresight initiatives: given 
their interdisciplinary and multi-sectoral nature, foresight exercises often 
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behave as a ‘knowledge junction’ between different areas of  research 
(EFMN 2009: 14), and impact in the form of  improved networking and 
information flows should not be ignored.
The debates around the impact of  scenarios are important because of  
their focus on transformational processes. The future is fundamentally 
unknowable, yet everyone holds implicit assumptions about the future, 
depending on their own mental model, based on experience and 
knowledge. By bringing together individuals operating within different 
paradigms, the worldview of  any one individual or organisation may be 
challenged, and thus individuals’ mental maps changed or expanded. 
This highlights the importance of  acknowledging and exploring 
uncertainty through collective process. Wack (1985: 140), a pioneer of  
scenario planning, describes the transformational process: ‘Scenarios deal 
with two worlds: the world of  facts and the world of  perceptions. They 
explore for facts but they aim at perceptions inside the heads of  decision-
makers. Their purpose is to gather and transform information of  
strategic significance into fresh perceptions. This transformational process 
is not trivial – more often than not it does not happen. When it works, 
it is a creative experience that generates a heartfelt “Aha!” from your 
managers… obliges them to question their assumptions…’. This kind of  
forward-thinking exercise with explicit consideration as to how the world 
will change may be compared to the collective design of  a theory of  
change for international development policies and programmes, where a 
range of  worldviews and assumptions may enrich the discussion and help 
to ensure that any strategy is ultimately more robust.
As in other applications of  foresight, the evidence of  use, usefulness and 
impact of  foresight initiatives in international development are largely 
anecdotal. In the organisational decision-making context, MacDonald 
(interview, 7 April 2014) considers that a key outcome is greater resilience, 
such that individuals and organisations are better prepared to face 
uncertainty and ‘to manoeuvre skilfully when life takes unforeseen turns’, 
but acknowledges that actually measuring this presents a challenge. In 
the context of  visionary public interest scenarios such as those developed 
in East Africa by SID, Heinzen (2004a) suggests that the creation of  a 
new shared language can be the marker of  successful scenario work; 
in the case of  the Tanzania scenarios, one noteworthy aspect was that 
subjects previously considered taboo, such as donor dependence and the 
supposed unity of  the country, became open discussion points when the 
scenarios were shared with the broader public (Eyakuze 2004). Heinzen 
also considers whether the foresight exercise led on to something else, 
as a measure of  success (Heinzen, interview 31 March 2014); she offers 
anecdotal evidence of  knock-on effects, explaining how individuals who 
were closely involved in (and transformed by) the process of  developing 
the Kenya scenarios with SID subsequently played a key role in the 
national government-led visioning process, Kenya Vision 2030.
Given the non-linearity and complexity of  policymaking processes, and 
the challenge of  evaluating how any subsequent decisions and policies 
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actually affect different stakeholders, and especially the poor, perhaps 
it is better to focus on assessing the extent to which the level of  futures 
literacy has changed among key stakeholders and decision-makers as a 
result of  the foresight process.
5 Conclusions and future directions
Foresight initiatives have been conducted by a range of  actors, in 
different thematic sectors, across different regions, on both a grand 
and a modest scale. Future-oriented studies are better established (and 
resourced) in certain sectors of  international development, such as food 
and agriculture, whilst no evidence was found of  foresight in relation to 
education in an international development context. There are interesting 
examples of  ad hoc initiatives and processes, such as the East Africa 
scenarios supported by SID. Yet, for the most part, futures thinking has 
not entered the mainstream of  international development in terms of  
the discourse and practice, and thus remains marginal to international 
development endeavour. This is hardly surprising, given that foresight 
is of  itself  a field still in its infancy. Whilst there are various repositories 
and databases of  foresight studies and projects, there are none dedicated 
to international development initiatives per se. With the exception of  
outputs generated by the Humanitarian Futures Programme, literature 
on foresight in the international humanitarian field is scant.
Foresight certainly has an important role to play in international 
development, to ensure that policies are robust and forward-looking, 
and that development organisations and institutions are resilient and 
agile, able to cope with change and manage increasing uncertainty 
and complexity in order to tackle the global and local development 
and humanitarian challenges ahead. Futures thinking could be more 
effectively integrated into strategy planning cycles of  international 
development institutions across the board and, in general, this would 
require greater futures literacy among international development 
actors. National-level policy thinktanks in Africa and elsewhere in the 
developing world have a particular role to play in supporting foresight 
studies, and promoting methodological adaptation and innovation 
in their various contexts. There is a great opportunity to harness 
rapid advancements in the field of  information and communications 
technology (ICT) for crowd-sourcing and collective intelligence as part 
of  foresight exercises, countering the more traditional top-down, expert-
led approaches.
Notes
* This article draws on Bingley, K. (2014) A Review of  Strategic Foresight 
in International Development, IDS Evidence Report 94, Brighton: IDS.
1 The Millennium Project, funded by the UN University, UNDP, 
UNESCO and the US Environment Protection Agency (EPA), 
describes itself  as an independent, non-profit, global participatory 
futures research thinktank that connects futurists, scholars, business 
planners and policymakers around the world to explore prospects for 
humanity as a whole.
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2 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
3 http://en.unesco.org/events/all-africa-futures-forum-transforming-
africa%E2%80%99s-future (accessed 1 August 2014).
4 Source: Foresight (2011).
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